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The epistemic approach to the analysis of games utilizes two basic ingredients.
The ﬁrst is a formal framework, or language, that allows the modeler to provide
a precise, exhaustive description of what players can do and think about each
other. The second is a set of assumptions, stated in the formal language one
chooses to adopt, about the players’ decision rules (e.g. sequential rationality)
and mutual beliefs (e.g., “Player 1 believes that Player 2 believes that 1 is
sequentially rational”).
These two ingredients are then “combined” to produce behavioral implications: that is, one proves that, within the framework of choice, a given set of
assumptions is satisﬁed (if and) only if players choose certain actions or strategies.
This approach is attractive because it allows the modeler to justify predictions, or characterize solution concepts, in terms of clearly deﬁned assumptions
about behavior and beliefs.
Furthermore, it promises to bridge the gap between decision theory and
game theory. Savage [4] and Anscombe and Aumann [1] provided axiomatic
characterizations of expected-utility maximization. In much the same spirit,
Aumann and Brandenburger [2] provide an axiomatic characterization of Nash
equilibrium, Tan and Werlang [5] characterize normal-form rationalizability, etc.
I remember Robert Wilson making this observation on several occasions.
His insistence on the importance of establishing proper foundations for game
theory, as well as his remarks on the subtle aspects of backward and forward
induction, prompted me to investigate strategic rationality in extensive games
from the point of view of of interactive epistemology.
The following paper is the ﬁrst in a series I coauthored with Pierpaolo Battigalli, then at Princeton University. Its aim is to provide the ﬁrst, basic ingredient
for the epistemic analysis of extensive games—a framework that allows one to
formulate assumptions about the players’ mutual conditional beliefs at each history or information set. We show that, loosely speaking, the model we propose
is rich enough to accommodate any combination of (coherent) assumptions, and
indicate some applications.
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Given our emphasis on mutual conditional beliefs, it would be impossible not
to mention Kreps and Wilson’s [3] inﬂuential paper on sequential equilibrium
as a major source of inspiration. While this applies to most of the literature
on extensive games since the early 80s, the following quotation from Kreps and
Wilson’s paper reveals that the connection with our own work is quite speciﬁc:
...making explicit the construction of beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path
enables discussion of which beliefs are “plausible” and which are
not... And such comparisons can often help one to choose among
sequential/perfect equilibria. ([3], p.864)
It is a pleasure to contribute the following paper to this collection in honor
of Robert Wilson. I do so with heartfelt gratitude for his advice and guidance.
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